Nuclear Bundles of Tropes and Ontological Dependence

José Tomás Alvarado
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile | jose.tomas.alvarado@gmail.com

Recibido: 27-Octubre-2016 | Aceptado: 5-Diciembre-2016 | Publicado: 20-Diciembre-2016
Texto Completo | Nota de Copyright | Índice Vol. 5 No. 6

Cómo citar este artículo:
Alvarado, José Tomás. «Nuclear Bundles of Tropes and Ontological Dependence». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 5:6 (2016), pp. 205-224.


Abstract | Several conceptions of trope bundles have postulated mutual relations of ontological dependence to explain the unity of the bundle. The idea is that a bundle is a plurality of tropes such that each one of them is dependent on any other. A variant of this idea is that there is a ‘nucleus’ of tropes all of them mutually dependent, and there is also a ‘periphery’ or ‘halo’ of tropes that are dependent on the tropes of the nucleus, but the tropes of the nucleus are not dependent on them. There are several theoretical advantages that trope bundles conceived in this way have. A weakness of the position nevertheless is that it requires an equivalence relation of dependence. But it has been normally supposed that dependence is a strict order, i.e. it is relation irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. Several recent works have put into question this traditional assumption. Those recent criticisms are discussed and it is argued that they are not convincing. Further arguments are presented for the irreflexivity and transitivity of dependence, from which asymmetry follows. Dependence, then, appears to be in fact a strict order. This implies that most forms of nuclear trope bundles are unintelligible. But not all of them, because nuclear tropes with a unique nuclear trope are coherent.
Keywords | Trope Bundle · Tropes · Nuclear Theory of Tropes · Ontological Dependence · Strict Order.

Cúmulos nucleares de tropos y dependencia ontológica

Resumen | Varias concepciones de cúmulos de tropos han postulado relaciones de dependencia ontológica mutuas para explicar la unidad del cúmulo. La idea es que un cúmulo es una pluralidad de tropos tal que cada uno de ellos es dependiente de cualquier otro. Una variante de esta idea es que hay un ‘núcleo’ de tropos todos ellos mutuamente dependientes y hay también una ‘periferia’ o ‘halo’ de tropos que son dependientes de los tropos del núcleo, pero los tropos del núcleo no son dependientes de ellos. Hay varias ventajas teóricas que tienen los cúmulos de tropos concebidos de este modo. Una debilidad de esta posición, sin embargo, es que requiere una relación de dependencia que sea una relación de equivalencia. Pero se ha supuesto normalmente que la dependencia es un orden estricto, esto es, una relación irreflexiva, asimétrica y transitiva. Varios trabajos recientes han puesto en cuestión este supuesto tradicional. Estas criticas recientes son aquí discutidas y se argumenta que no son convincentes. Se presentan argumentos adicionales para la irreflexividad y la transitividad de la dependencia, de lo que se sigue la asimetría. Entonces, la dependencia resulta ser un orden estricto. Esto implica que la mayoría de las formas de cúmulos nucleares de tropos son ininteligibles. Pero no todos, porque los cúmulos nucleares con un único tropo nuclear son coherentes.
Palabras Clave | Cúmulo de Tropos · Tropos · Teoría Nuclear de Tropos · Dependencia Ontológica · Orden Estricto.


Referencias

Barnes, Elizabeth (2012). «Emergence and Fundamentality». Mind 121: pp. 873–901. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzt001

Barnes, Elizabeth (2014). «Symmetric dependence». Unpublished manuscript. Accessible from http://elizabethbarnesphilosophy.weebly.com/uploads/3/8/1/0/38105685/symmetric_dependence.pdf.

Bliss, Ricki (2012). «Viciousness and the Structure of Reality». Philosophical Studies 166 (2): pp. 399–418. doi: 10.1007/s11098–012–0043–0

Bliss, Ricki (2014). «Viciousness and Circles of Ground». Metaphilosophy 45 (2): pp. 245–256. doi: 10.1111/meta.12072

Campbell, Keith (1981). «The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars». Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6: pp. 477–488. doi: 10.1111/j.1475–4975.1981.tb00453.x

Campbell, Keith (1990). Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.

Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin (eds.) (2012). Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Denkel, Arda (1996). Object and Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511554575

Ehring, Douglas (2011). Tropes. Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608539.001.0001

Fine, Kit (1994). «Essence and Modality». Philosophical Perspectives 8: pp. 1–16. doi: 10.2307/2214160

Fine, Kit (1995a). «Ontological Dependence». Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: pp. 269–290. doi: 10.1093/aristotelian/95.1.269

Fine, Kit (1995b). «The Logic of Essence». Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3): pp. 241–273. doi: 10.1007/BF01344203

Fine, Kit (2012). «Guide to Ground». In: Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by F. Correia and B. Schnieder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–80. doi: 10.1017/cbo9781139149136.002

Garcia, Robert K. (2014). «Tropes and Dependency Profiles: Problems for the Nuclear Theory of Substance». American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2): pp. 167–176.

Hoffman, Joshua and Rosenkrantz, Gary (1994). Substance Among Other Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511527425

Husserl, Edmund (1913). Logische Untersuchungen, Herausgegeben von Ursula Panzer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.

Jenkins, Carry (2011). «Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?». The Monist 94 (2): pp. 267–276. doi: 10.5840/monist201194213

Keinänen, Markku (2005). Trope Theory and the Problem of Universals. Helsinki: Philosophical Studies from the University of Heksinki.

Keinänen, Markku (2011). «Tropes: The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars?». Dialectica 65 (3): pp. 419–450. doi: 10.1111/j.1746–8361.2011.01276.x

King, Jeffrey C. (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001

Koslicki, Kathrin (2012). «Varieties of Ontological Dependence». In: Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by F. Correia and B. Schnieder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186–213. doi: 10.1017/cbo9781139149136.008

Lowe, E. Jonathan (1999). The Possibility of Metaphysics. Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009). «Ontological Dependence». En: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, editada por Edward N. Zalta.  (Winter 2009 Edition). Stanford, CA: Stanford University. URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence–ontological/. Retrieved on July 20th, 2014.

Maurin, Anna–Sofia (2002). If Tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer. doi: 10.1007/978–94–017–0079–5

Pasnau, Robert (2011). Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567911.001.0001

Rodriguez–Pereyra, Gonzalo (2015). «Grounding is Not a Strict Order». Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3): pp. 517–534. doi: 10.1017/apa.2014.22

Schaffer, Jonathan (2012). «Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity». In: Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by F. Correia and B. Schnieder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122–138. doi: 10.1017/cbo9781139149136.005

Schnieder, Benjamin (2006). «A Certain Kind of Trinity: Dependence, Substance, Explanation». Philosophical Studies 129: pp. 393–419. doi: 10.1007/s11098–005–4636–8

Schnieder, Benjamin (2010). «A Logic for ‘Because’». The Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3): pp. 445–465. doi: 10.1017/S1755020311000104

Simons, Peter (1987). Parts. A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Simons, Peter (1994). «Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: pp. 553–575. doi: 10.2307/2108581

Simons, Peter (1998). «Farewell to Substance: A Differentiated Leave–Taking». Ratio 11 (3): pp. 235–252. doi: 10.1111/1467–9329.00069

Simons, Peter (2000). «Identity Through Time and Trope Bundles». Topoi 19: pp. 147–155. doi: 10.1023/A:1006485216998

Soames, Scott (2010). What is Meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press. doi: 10.1515/9781400833948

Williams, Donald C. (1953a). «On the Elements of Being I». Review of Metaphysics 7: pp. 3–18.

Williams, Donald C. (1953b). «On the Elements of Being II». Review of Metaphysics 7: pp. 171–192.


Información Adicional
Disputatio [Diciembre 2016], Volumen 5, Número 6, pp. 205-224
Artículo | [eng] | Estadísticas | BIBLID [2254-0601(2016)5:6; pp.205-224]
URI: http://gredos.usal.es/jspui/handle/10366/131926


© El autor(es) 2016. Publicado por Disputatio bajo una licencia Creative Commons, por tanto Vd. puede copiar, distribuir y comunicar públicamente este artículo. No obstante, debe tener en cuenta lo prescrito en la nota de copyright. Permisos, preguntas, sugerencias y comentarios, dirigirse a este correo electrónico: boletin@disputatio.eu o rellenar este formulario.