How to be a Realist about Natural Kinds

P. D. Magnus
University at Albany, State University of New York, USA | pmagnus@fecundity.com

Received: 10-November-2018 | Accepted: 22-December-2018 | Published: 31-December-2018
Disputatio [Dec. 2018], Vol. 7, No. 8, a016 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2553734
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 7 No. 8

How to cite this article:
Magnus, P. D. (2018). «How to be a realist about natural kinds». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 7, no. 8: a016.


Abstract | Although some authors hold that natural kinds are necessarily relative to disciplinary domains, many authors presume that natural kinds must be absolute, categorical features of the reality —often assuming that without even mentioning the alternative. Recognizing both possibilities, one may ask whether the difference especially matters. I argue that it does. Looking at recent arguments about natural kind realism, I argue that we can best make sense of the realism question by thinking of natural kindness as a relation that holds between a category and a domain.
Keywords |
 Natural Kinds · Realism · Anti-realism.

Cómo ser un realista sobre especies naturales

Resumen | No obstante de que algunos autores sostienen que especies naturales son necesariamente relativas a los dominios de disciplinas, hay muchos autores que suponen que especies naturales tienen que ser características absolutas, categóricas de la realidad — suponiéndolo sin siquiera hacer mención de la alternativa. Pero una vez que se reconozcan ambas posibilidades, uno se podría preguntar si la diferencia es particularmente importante. Yo arguyo que sí. Con remisión a argumentos recientes arguyo que la cuestión del realismo se ilumina de la mejor manera si pensamos de la especiedad natural como de una relación que se da entre una categoría y un dominio.
Palabras Clave | Especies naturales · Realismo · Anti-realismo.


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