Time and truth: on the relationship between some metaphysical and semantic theses

Elton Marques
Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal | eltonmarques@campus.ul.pt

Received: 3-January-2018 | Accepted: 21-May-2018 | Published: 31-December-2018
Disputatio [Dec. 2018], Vol. 7, No. 8, a001 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2550524
Article | [PT] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 7 No. 8

How to cite this article:
Marques, Elton (2018). «Tempo e verdade: acerca das relações entre algumas teses metafísicas e semântica». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 7, no. 8: a001.

Abstract | In this article, I try to identify the right connexion between some metaphysical theses (eternalism and determinism) and some semantic theses (closed and open future). Having established that, I will then posit two principles (Metaphysical-Semantical Determination Principle and Semantical-Metaphysical Indetermination Principle), making them available to philosophical debates, such as the debate about future contingents and its variants. The principles in question summarize the contribution that the relations between those theses can offer when well established. We will eventually see that we cannot deduce those metaphysical theses from the semantic theses in question, although we can move from the metaphysical theses to the semantic theses.
Keywords |
 Future Contingents · Eternalism · Determinism · Principle of Bivalence.

Tempo e verdade: acerca das relações entre algumas teses metafísicas e semântica

Resumo | Neste artigo, meu objetivo será identificar a relação entre algumas teses metafísicas (eternismo e determinismo) e semânticas (futuro fechado e futuro aberto). Uma vez tendo isso por estabelecido, irei postular dois princípios (princípio de determinação metafísico-semântico e princípio de indeterminação semântico-metafísico), os quais pretendo tornar disponíveis para debates filosóficos, como por exemplo o debate sobre os futuros contingentes e suas variantes. Os princípios em questão resumem a contribuição que as relações entre as teses podem oferecer, quando bem estabelecidas. Após tudo, veremos que não podemos deduzir destas teses semânticas aquelas teses metafísicas, embora possamos passar das teses metafísicas para as teses semânticas em questão.
Palavras Chaves | Futuros contingentes · Eternismo · Determinismo · Princípio da Bivalência.


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