Manipulating Shadows: Towards an Evidentialist (Dis)solution of the Causal Exclusion Problem

Lorenzo Baravalle
Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal |

Received: 16-May-2019 | Accepted: 26-November-2019 | Published: 27-December-2019
Disputatio [Dec. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 11, pp. 355–380 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3594058
Article | [SP] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [sp] | Vol. 8 No. 11

How to cite this article:
Baravalle, Lorenzo (2019). «Manipulando sombras: Hacia una (dis)solución evidencialista del problema de la exclusión causal». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 11: pp. 355–380.

Abstract | A classic problem in philosophy of mind is the possible exclusion of mental causes with respect to the physical ones. This problem, popularised by Jaegwon Kim, has undesirable consequences for any scientific discipline committed with causal claims related to supervenient properties. Focusing on issues concerning causal claims in the special sciences, I discuss in this paper the solution to the causal exclusion problem put forward by a group of authors occasionally called «evidentialists». Evidentialists consider that causal exclusion problem can be solved by appealing to the manipulationist notion of cause, originally formulated by James Woodward. Throughout the last 10 year, the evidentialist view has received some criticisms by Michael Baumgartner. My goal is to show in which respects these criticisms are correct, but do not compromise the overall validity of the evidentialist view.
Keywords |
Supervenience · Causal Models · Manipulationism · Evidentialism.

Manipulando sombras: Hacia una (di)solución evidencialista del problema de la exclusión causal

Abstract | Un problema clásico en filosofía de la mente es el de la posible exclusión de las causas mentales respecto a las físicas. Tal problema, popularizado por Jaegwon Kim, tiene consecuencias indeseables para cualquier disciplina científica que se comprometa con atribuir relevancia causal a propiedades supervenientes. Enfocando mi atención sobre cuestiones relacionadas con atribuciones causales en las ciencias especiales, discuto en este artículo la solución al problema de la exclusión causal propuesta por un grupo de autores ocasionalmente denominados «evidencialistas». Los evidencialistas consideran que el problema de la exclusión causal puede ser solucionado apelando a la noción de causa manipulacionista, elaborada originariamente por James Woodward. A lo largo de los últimos 10 años, la perspectiva evidencialista ha recibido algunas críticas por parte de Michael Baumgartner. Mi objetivo es el de mostrar en que aspectos estas críticas son acertadas, pero no comprometen substancialmente la validez de la perspectiva evidencialista.
Parole chiave | Superveniencia · Modelos causales · Manipulacionismo · Evidencialismo.


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