Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky: To Shorten the Distance

Juan José Acero
Universidad de Granada, Spain | acero@ugr.es

Received: 24-January-2019 | Accepted: 8-April-2019 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3242071
Article | [SP] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9

How to cite this article:
Acero, Juan José (2019). «Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky: recortando distancias». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00-00.


Abstract | In this work the widely endorsed claim that the conceptions of language that the late Wittgenstein and Chomsky respectively shaped conflict with each other is rejected. On such a viewpoint, while Wittgenstein would have viewed language as a repertoire of actions articulated by social relationships, Chomsky understands language as a faculty of human’s biological nature, just like the visual system. In the first six sections of the paper the main criteria resorted to support such an alleged incompatibility are deactivated: either they are coarse enough to make it impossible to render philosophical useful conclusions or they ignore central elements of both Wittgenstein’s and Chomsky’s philosophies of language. In particular, the confusion that undermines this debate is cleared up by lending attention to the kind of language rules that they respectively focus on. In the remaining sections an argument is built up that goes deeper in the latter criticism’s implications. The argument zooms in on the assumption that language is a completely homogenous whole. Once this assumption is brought to light, the alleged incompatibility loosens its grip and nothing stands in the way of concluding that Wittgenstein’s and Chomsky’s conceptions of language are far from being fully opposite.
Keywords |
Wittgenstein · John McDowell · Particularism · Rule Following · Externalism.

Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky: recortando distancias

Resumen | En este trabajo exploro dos formas de ser quietista en filosofía y las relaciono con la filosofía de Wittgenstein y McDowell. En un primer sentido, el quietismo podría entenderse como la obligación de permanecer silencioso con respecto a las cuestiones que más valoramos. Los aforismos finales del Tractatus parecen apuntar en esta dirección. El segundo sentido es una negativa a producir teorías filosóficas con respecto a cuestiones generales y abstractas como el significado o el pensamiento. McDowell ha presentado una lectura en esta última línea de las Investigaciones y ha seguido esta dirección en la mayoría de su propia filosofía. Discuto algunas consecuencias de este segundo enfoque para el seguimiento de reglas, el externismo sobre lo mental y el particularismo ético e intento mostrar que hay muchas posibilidades de realizar investigación filosófica de importancia incluso tras el abandono de las grandes pretensiones teóricas.
Palabras Clave | Wittgenstein · McDowell · Particularismo · Seguimiento de Reglas · Externismo.


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