The Pragmatic Gettier: Brandom on Knowledge and Belief

María José Frápolli
Universidad de Granada, Spain |

Received: 31-August-2018 | Accepted: 15-December-2018 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2652385
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9

How to cite this article:

Frápolli, María José (2019). «The Pragmatic Gettier Brandom on Knowledge and Belief». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00–00.

Abstract | Knowledge and belief fully display the pragmatic features that make of them different concepts only in third-person epistemic attributions. This is the main thesis of this paper, which has three sections. In section 1 I argue, following a pragmatic reading of Gettier, that agents on their own lights cannot tell the difference between what they know and what they believe that they know. The reason lies on the pragmatic peculiarities of normative notions, which according to Brandom’s normative expressivism amount to saying that first-person epistemic claims lack the required complexity to ground a complete contrasting analysis of the concepts of knowledge and belief. Section 2 deals with the norms of assertion and elaborates in more classical terms something that follows from Brandom’s treatment of assertions, i.e. that assertions are expressions of belief that must be taken as knowledge claims. Finally, in section 3, I propose to explain the link between third person ascriptions and first person avowals by borrowing one of Ramsey’s hints on truth ascriptions to derive the role of the latter from that of the former. First-person epistemic claims, I suggest, are essentially the result of reactive actions, being their role dependent upon the functioning of third-person attributions.
Keywords |
Assertion · Epistemic Claims · Epistemic Attributions · Expressivism · Ramsey.

El Gettier pragmático: Brandom sobre conocimiento y creencia

Resumen | Conocimiento y creencia despliegan plenamente las características pragmáticas que los convierten en conceptos diferentes sólo en atribuciones epistémicas de tercera persona. Esta es la tesis principal de este trabajo que tiene tres secciones. En la sección 1 arguyo, de acuerdo a una lectura pragmática de Gettier, que los agentes no pueden decir, desde su propio punto de vista, cuál es la diferencia entre lo que saben y lo que creen saber. La razón de esto se encuentra en las peculiaridades pragmáticas de nociones normativas que, de acuerdo al expresivismo normativo de Brandom, equivale a decir que declaraciones epistémicas de primera persona carecen de la complejidad requerida para servir de base de un análisis contrastante completo de los conceptos de conocimiento y creencia. La sección 2 se ocupa de las normas de afirmación y detalla en términos más clásicos algo que se sigue del tratamiento Brandomiano de afirmaciones, a saber, que las afirmaciones son expresiones de creencias que se tienen que tomar como declaraciones de conocimiento. Finalmente, en la sección 3 propongo explicar la conexión entre adscripciones de tercera persona y manifestaciones de primera persona tomando prestado una de las indicaciones de Ramsey acerca de adscripciones de verdad para derivar el papel de los últimos de aquel de los primeros. Declaraciones epistémicas de primera persona, sugiero, son esencialmente el resultado de acciones reactivas, su papel dependiendo del funcionamiento de las atribuciones de tercera persona.
Palabras Clave | Afirmación · Declaraciones epistémicas · Atribuciones epistémicas · Expresivismo · Ramsey.


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