Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom’s Normative Pragmatics

Daniel E. Kalpokas
IdH-CONICET/UNC, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina |

Received: 14-April-2018 | Accepted: 3-August-2018 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3236910
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9

How to cite this article:
Kalpokas, Daniel E. (2019). «Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom’s Normative Pragmatics». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00-00.

Abstract | Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports.
Keywords |
Wittgenstein · Seeing Aspects · Reliabilism · Perceptual Experience · Observation Reports.

Percepción: un punto ciego en la pragmática normativa de Brandom

Resumen | Brandom explica el conocimiento perceptivo como el producto de dos clases distintivas de capacidades: (i) la capacidad para discriminar confiable y conductualmente entre diferentes clases de estímulos, y (ii) la capacidad para adoptar una posición en el juego de dar y pedir razones. Sin embargo, al focalizarse exclusivamente en la autorización de los informes de observación, más que en la percepción misma, pasa por alto una concepción de la experiencia perceptiva como una clase de estado mental con contenido. En este artículo argumento que este es un punto ciego que hace a la explicación de Brandom del conocimiento perceptivo incapaz de acomodar apropiadamente el fenómeno de ver aspectos y de explicar cómo podemos justificar las atribuciones de confiabilidad a los observadores que hacen informes de observación.
Palabras Clave | Wittgenstein · Aspectos visuales · Fiabilismo · Experiencia perceptiva · Informes de observación.


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