What the Picture Tells Me Is Itself”: The Reflexivity of Knowledge between Brandom and Wittgenstein

Vojtěch Kolman
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic | vojtech.kolman @ff.cuni.cz

Received: 30-March-2018 | Accepted: 15-July-2019 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.0000000
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9

How to cite this article:

Kolman, Vojtěch (2019). «“What the Picture Tells Me Is Itself”: The Reflexivity of Knowledge between Brandom and Wittgenstein». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00–00.

Abstract | Both Brandom and Wittgenstein base their concepts of experience on the game metaphor and the associated concept of rule. In fact, what Brandom seems to do is further refine Wittgenstein’s vocabulary by specifying the game as the game of giving and asking for reasons and rules as the rules of inference. By replacing the plurality of “games” with the one and only “game”, though, Brandom also lays the ground for a possible discord. This relates particularly to the cognitive significance of different forms of human experience, such as music or art in general, which are treated by Wittgenstein as language games despite their being rather independent of claims and commitments and despite their utterly lacking the representational dimension. In my paper, I will show that with respect to these objections (as phrased, e.g., by Andrew Bowie), one can argue that Brandom is in fact true to Wittgenstein’s instruction to always read his Investigations against his Tractatus. The general idea is to look at the game and picture metaphor as parts of a single concept that both philosophers work on together by going back to the very idealist concept of reflexivity or self-consciousness.
Keywords |
Language Game · Self-Consciousness · Reflexivity · Game Metaphor · Hegel.

“Lo que el retrato me relata es a sí mismo”: la reflexividad del conocimiento entre Brandom y Wittgenstein

Resumen | Tanto Brandom como Wittgenstein basan sus conceptos de la experiencia en la metáfora del juego y el concepto asociado de la regla. De hecho, lo que Brandom parece hacer es refinar adicionalmente el vocabulario de Wittgenstein al especificar el juego como el juego de dar y preguntar por razones y las reglas como reglas de inferencia. Al reemplazar el plural de «juegos» con el único «juego» Brandom, sin embargo, también prepara el terreno para una posible discordancia. Esto tiene que ver en particular con la significancia cognitiva de las diferentes formas de la experiencia humana, tales como la música o el arte en general. Wittgenstein trata a estas como juegos de lenguaje, no obstante de que sean más bien independientes de afirmaciones y compromisos y no obstante de carecer totalmente de la dimensión representacional. En mi trabajo mostraré que con relación a estas objeciones (como las formuló, e.g., Andrew Bowie), se puede argüir que Brandom cumple de hecho la instrucción de Wittgenstein de siempre leer sus Investigaciones contra su Tractatus. La idea general es tomar la metáfora del juego y del retrato como partes de un único concepto en el cual ambos filósofos trabajan juntos al retornar al concepto idealista de la reflexividad o autoconsciencia.
Palabras Clave | Juego de lenguaje · Autoconsciencia · Reflexividad · Metáfora de juego · Hegel.


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