Wittgenstein and Brandom on Normativity and Sociality

Danielle Macbeth
Haverford College, United States of America | dmacbeth@haverford.edu

Received: 17-January-2018 | Accepted: 24-April-2018 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2648311
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9

How to cite this article:
Macbeth, Danielle (2019). «Wittgenstein and Brandom on Normativity and Sociality». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00-00.


Abstract | In Making It Explicit Brandom distinguishes between, as he puts it, I–We and I–Thou sociality. Only I–Thou sociality, Brandom argues, is adequate to the task of instituting norms relevant to our self–understanding as rational beings because only I–Thou sociality can render intelligible the distinction between how norms are applied and how they ought to be applied —however anyone thinks they ought to be applied. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein defends a version of I–We sociality, one that is not, I argue, subject to Brandom’s criticisms. Indeed, I suggest, it is just such a conception of I–We sociality as we find in Wittgenstein’s Investigations that is needed if we are fully to understand the respects in which we are, as the rational beings we are, answerable to the norm of truth.
Keywords |
Form of Life · I-Thou Sociality · I-We Sociality · Objectivity · Rule Following.

Wittgenstein y Brandom sobre normatividad y socialidad

Resumen | En Making it Explicit Brandom distingue entre, según él dice, socialidad yo–nosotros y yo–tú. Brandom arguye que sólo la socialidad yo–tú es adecuada para la tarea de instituir normas que son relevantes para nuestra auto–comprensión como seres racionales porque sólo yo–tú puede hacer que sea inteligible la distinción entre cómo normas son aplicadas y como deberían ser aplicadas —sea como sea que uno piense que deberían ser aplicadas. En sus Investigaciones Filósoficas, Wittgenstein defiende una versión de yo–nosotros socialidad, una versión que no es vulnerable a la crítica de Brandom, según arguyo. De hecho, sugiero, es justamente semejante concepción de socialidad yo–nosotros como la que encontramos en las Investigaciones de Wittgenstein que se requiere si queremos comprender plenamente en respecto a qué somos, como los seres racionales que somos, responsables a la norma de la verdad.
Palabras Clave | Forma de vida · Socialidad yo–tú · Socialidad yo–nosotros · Objetividad · Seguir una regla.


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