Negation, material incompatibilities and inferential thickness: a Brandomian take on Middle Wittgenstein

Marcos Silva
Universidade Federal de Alagoas, Brasil |

Received: 4-October-2018 | Accepted: 21-January-2019 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3247939
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9

How to cite this article:
Silva, Marcos (2019). «Negation, material incompatibilities and inferential thickness: a Brandomian take on Middle Wittgenstein». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00-00.

Abstract | By 1929, after the full acknowledgment of the colour–exclusion problem, Wittgenstein had to admit that material incompatibilities presented in conceptual systems (Satzsysteme) could not be reduced to formal tautologies and contradictions. Wittgenstein then, in his middle period, had to examine the kind of negation which, for instance, colour systems should render, which expose not just one but many or, in some cases, infinite inferentially articulated alternatives. Here, inspired by Brandom’s inferentialism (1994, 2001, 2008), I explore the idea that Wittgenstein, in his middle period, advocated a form of inferentialism based on the inferentially articulated content of propositions in Satzsysteme. At that time, Wittgenstein suggested that every sentence should be logically connected to many others. I call this feature inferential thickness. Therefore, I use Löf’s (2013) normative read of verificationism to explain Middle Wittgenstein’s holist solution to problems concerning the use of negation related to material incompatibilities and determination of propositional sense. I also investigate the distinction between contrariety and contradiction and some possible connections to a mandatory restriction of the principle of excluded middle in Satzsysteme.
Keywords |
Negation · Material Incompatibilities · Inferential Thickness.

Negación, incompatibilidades materiales y densidad inferencial: una lectura brandomiana del Wittgenstein Mediano

Resumen | Por 1929, después de reconocer plenamente el problema de exclusión de color, Wittgenstein tuvo que admitir que incompatibilidades materiales presentadas en sistemas conceptuales (Satzsysteme) no se podían reducir a tautologías y contradicciones formales. Wittgenstein tuvo que examinar entonces, en su periodo mediano, el tipo de negación que, por ejemplo, sistemas de color deberían producir que no exponen sólo una, sino muchas o, en algunos casos, infinitas alternativas articuladas inferencialmente. Exploro en este trabajo, inspirado en el inferencialismo de Brandom (1994, 2000, 2008) la idea de que Wittgenstein abogó en su período mediano por una forma de inferencialismo basada en el contenido articulado inferencialmente de proposiciones en Satzsysteme. En este período, Wittgenstein sugirió que cada oración debería estar lógicamente conectada con muchas otras. Yo llamo esta característica densidad inferencial. Por tanto, uso la lectura normativa del verificacionismo de Löf (2013) para explicar la solución holista de Wittgenstein Mediano a problemas referentes al uso de negación relacionados con incompatibilidades materiales y la determinación de sentido proposicional. También investigo la distinción entre contrariedad y contradicción y algunas conexiones posibles con una restricción obligatoria del principio del tercer excluido en Satzsysteme.
Palabras Clave | Nagación · Incompatibilidad Material · Densidad inferencial.


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